



# **Enhancing Transparency: Insights From the Common Criteria Certification Ecosystem**

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



#### CVE-2017-15361 (RoCA)

- [CVE-2017-15361]: practical factorization of certain RSA keys.
- Billion+ devices affected.

 M How many products certified under Common Criteria are impacted?


#### CVE-2017-15361





#### What if you need help answering questions like

- What processor architectures are commonly used in certifications/products of interest?
- How do we compare with our competitors (their certified products)?
- Check how long evaluations take for certain labs, types of products, etc.



### Main functionality of sec-certs.org project


- Fulltext search over all CC and FIPS 140 certificates
- Continuous insight into certification ecosystem
- Extracted graph of references between certificates
- Mapping to NIST National Vulnerability Database (CVEs)
- Automatic notification of events for observed certificates (RSS feed)
- Correlation of certification requirements and vulnerability occurrence
- Python API for custom queries, preprocessed datasets for downloads
- Connecting additional metadata about certified items (tests, information)
- Local processing with inclusion of non-public documents

#### Users of the sec-certs.org tool


- Owners/users of certified devices / security researchers
  - What security claims are made?
  - What certificates to additionally monitor?
  - Notification after new (possibly relevant) vulnerability is found
  - Analyze impact of vulnerability (e.g., ROCA case)
- Vendors of certified products
  - Are we under/over certifying with respect to competition?
  - Who is certifying products of our type and what were requirements in past?
- Certification bodies
  - Performance of labs, suspiciously short validity, non-standard cert. claims...
  - Impact of certification requirements (SARs) on the actual security

#### Users of the sec-certs.org tool

- Certification laboratories
  - Are we comparable with other laboratories? What are the trends?
- Government agencies & corporations
  - Processing additional non-public documents
  - Attaching additional metadata (test results, powertrace...) and its governance
    - Generate sec-certs "web" locally with additional information
- General public
  - Easy access to information (interactive webpage, info from multiple sources...)
  - Ecosystem insights: What is standardized? Change in time?



#### **VARIOUS ECOSYSTEM INSIGHTS**




## REFERENCES, REFERENCES, REFER...

#### **Building the reference graph**

- Each device is a vertex.
- A reference from device A to device B is a directed edge.
  - The reference is indicated by the presence of a foreign certificate ID within the artifacts.
- The categorical context of the reference, e.g. `COMPONENT\_USED`,
  is an edge label.
- We worked with 5780 vertices and 3007 edges.


#### **Building the reference graph**




#### Inferring reference contexts

- Two major contexts: `COMPONENT\_REUSE` & `PREDECESSOR`
  - Component used (C)
  - Component shared (C)
  - Evaluation reused (C)
  - Re-evaluation (P)
  - Previous version (P)
- 75% of references constitute real dependencies, 25% are predecessor references.


#### **Ecosystem trends**



Reference context freq.



(b) Avg. # trans. refs



(c) Average product reach

#### Few major observations from reference analyses

- Top-10 products are used in 16% of all active smartcards.
  - These are microcontrollers, typically with cryptographic functionality.
- Higher reach is positively associated with higher evaluation assurance level.
- A vulnerability in cryptographic functionality would spread from high-reach devices to approx. 70% of their dependents.
  - Affecting 50+ certified products, RoCA was not an outlier.

#### In a nutshell

- We have developed a pipeline for automated processing of Common Criteria artifacts.
  - We also cover FIPS 140 and NVD vulnerability DB.
  - Mapping of dependencies among certificates
  - Continuous insights into certification ecosystem
  - Support for more transparency in security certifications
- The analysis is tedious due to artefacts produced by humans and meant to be consumed by humans.

### Come and play – with sec-certs!



https://sec-certs.org/

## Thank you for your attention!





Cyber-security Excellence Hub in Estonia and South Moravia



